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Challenges Against Jurors in Courts-Martial'
I.

Introduction

It has been said that "[m]ilitary justice is not to justice what military music is to music. U.S. military courts provide more safeguards
for individual rights than any system of justice in the world."' 2 One
of the most important safeguards provided for the military defendant
is the right to have. his attorney conduct a voir dire of the jury in an
attempt to have the case heard by impartial court members.' The
peculiarities of the military juror selection process4 and the limitations on peremptory challenges in courts-martial5 heighten the importance of a well-prepared and skillfully presented voir dire. And
yet, the voir dire and challenging portions of the trial often receive
only cursory treatment by both military attorneys and civilian attorneys practicing in military courts.
The peculiarities in the selection process and the resulting typical
composition of the military jury provide excellent reasons for conducting a thorough voir dire. Despite sporadic interest in changing
the selection process,6 it appears that these reasons will remain. The
members of a court-martial are appointed to their duty as court
1. For a brief but informative introduction to the military justice system, see Lederer,
The Road to the Militaq Courthouse, [ABA] (1976). For a more in-depth treatment, see E.

[Naval Institute Press] (3d ed. 1981).
2. M. BELLI, My LIFE ON TRIAL 356 (1977) (emphasis in original).
3. Jurors in the military justice system are interchangeably referred to as jurors, court
members, or members. The 'jury" is the jury or the panel.
4. The most striking difference between the military system and other systems is that
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military juries are not chosen at random. See generally Remcho, Military Juries: Constitutional
Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47 IND. L.J. 193 (1973); Brookshire,Juror Selection under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Fact and Fiction, 58 MIL.L. REV. 71 (1972); Smallridge, The
MilitaryJu, Selection Reform Movement, 19 A.F.L. REv. 343 (1978).

5. "Each accused and the trial counsel is entitled to one peremptory challenge .
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C. § 841 (1976) [The UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUsTICE is codified in 10 U.S.c. §§ 801-941 and is hereinafter cited as
U.C.MJ. or Code.].
6. There is currently a bill before the United States House of Representatives proposing
a random selection of military jurors, fixed numbers ofjurors, and increased numbers of peremptory challenges, H.R. 6130, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), and one before the United States
Senate proposing less drastic reform, S.2521, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see also, articles
cited supra note 4.
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members by the "convening authority" 7 typically for a period of several months,' during which time they decide all cases brought before
them.9 They are members of the convening authority's command,
and are selected personally by the convening authority on the basis
of age, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.10 Most often, though, the selection is made from a list of potential members submitted by subordinate commanders, compiled
by a staff judge advocate or legal officer, and containing little if anything more than the name, rank, social security number, and unit of
assignment" of each potential member. The convening authority
can make the most competent selection decisions when he 12 personally knows the member, and for the rest, rank is the most obvious
discriminator. Unfortunately the higher ranking members of the
court usually have played or do play a significant role in maintaining
discipline within their respective units.13 Despite this apparent conflict between the member's role in the military community (and the
convening authority's interest in maintaining discipline within his
command) and the interests of fairness and impartiality, the court
member as a commissioned warrant officer (and the enlisted member
when requested by the accused)" is presumed capable of putting
aside personal feelings, biases, and outside influences preventing him
7. The convening authority is that commander empowered to make the final decision
concerning whether or not there will be a trial. The size of the installation and the particular
command is determinative of that power. See U.C.M.J., arts. 22-24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24
(1976). There are three levels of court-martial, varying according to the sentencing power
and procedures used in each, see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, pares. 14-16 (rev. ed.
1969). [The Manual for Courts-Martial implements the Code by Executive Order and is
hereinafter cited as M.C.M. or the Manual.]. Since the accused is not entitled to trial by jury
in a summary court-martial, such proceedings will not be discussed in this Note. See M.C.M.,
para. 79.
8. "When practicable, the convening authority should change the composition of
courts-martial from time to time to provide the maximum opportunity for eligible personnel
to gain experience ... ." M.C.M., para. 37a.
9. The convening authority may appoint more than one standing panel and in convening courts-martial, detail cases to them on an alternating or other basis.
10. U.C.M.J., art. 25(d)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1976); M.C.M., para. 4d.
11. The Manual, para. 46, pursuant to U.C.M.J., art. 25(c)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1976),
defines a "unit" as the smallest organization for which a separate daily status report is
prepared.
12. This Note, for the sake of uniformity only, uses the masculine gender throughout.
13. When an officer has reached a relatively high rank in his service he usually has, with
the possible exception of some specialties such as medical doctors, had at least one assignment
as a commander or leader in which he was directly responsible for the maintenance of discipline and morale.
14. See U.C.M.J., art. 25(c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1976); M.C.M., para. 6 l.
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from fairly and impartially hearing the case and deciding the sentence. 5 It is against the member who maintains an "inelastic attitude"' 6 in regard to a particular defendant or crime that a challenge
for cause lies. The attorney practicing in military court can best protect the interests of his client, lay the proper foundation for successful
challenges for cause, and most advantageously exercise the accused's
right to the peremptory challenge only through a competent eliciting
of responses from and analysis of the members both during and
before voir dire.
This Note will summarize the provisions of the Unform Code of
MilitagyJustice and the Manualfor Courts-Martialas well as the decisions of the military appellate courts" in order to assist counsel in
preparing for the conduct of voir dire and the challenge procedure.
The Note will also discuss pre-trial preparation for the voir dire. The
goals are to help the military attorney make better use of his client's
right to challenge members of the court; and to give the civilian attorney a better understanding of the challenge process in courts-martial so that he will be more inclined to accept the case of the military
defendant.' This Note will also discuss many of the skills and techniques regularly utilized in civilian courts that can be brought to the
military justice system.
II.

The Challenge for Cause

The Uniform Code of MilitaygJustice [hereinafter the Code] provides
the statutory basis for the military justice system and the conduct of
15. Court members take an oath to this general effect. See M.C.M., para. 114b.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
17. There are two levels of appellate courts. Each service has its court of military review
(such as the Army Court of Military Review). Those courts were originally entitled "Boards
of Review" and decisions from those will be distinguished in the citation. The highest level of
military appellate review is at the United States Court of Military Appeals, which hears cases
from the lower courts of review.
18. . . . (1) The accused has the right to be represented in his defense before a
general or special court-martial or at an investigation under section 832 of this title
(article 32) as provided in this subsection.
(2) The accused may be represented by civilian counsel if provided by him.
(3) The accused may be represented"(A) by military counsel detailed under section 827 of this title (article
27); or
"(B) by military counsel of his own selection if that counsel is reasonably
available. . ..
(4) If the accused is represented by civilian counsel, military counsel detailed
or selected under paragraph (3) shall act as associate counsel unless excused at the
request of the accused . . ..
U.C.M.J., art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838 (1976).
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courts-martial. The rights and privileges of the accused in the military justice system are not, therefore, based on the Constitution, but
on the laws enacted by Congress. 9 In UnitedStates v. Clay, the Court
of Military Appeals identified the right to challenge members of the
court for cause or peremptorily as one of the fundamental rights in
"military due process."' 20 The Code provides that:
The military judge21 and members of a general or special courtmartial may be challenged by the accused ... for cause stated to
the court. The military judge, or, if none, the court, 2 2 shall determine the relevancy and validity of challenges for cause, and may
not receive a challenge to more than one person at a time.23 Challenges by the trial counsel shall ordinarily be presented and decided
before those by the accused are offered.2 4
The provisions of the Code are expanded upon and procedures are
established for the conduct of courts-martial in the Manualfor CouresMartial, [hereinafter the Manual]. The Manual is prescribed by Executive Order pursuant to the Code.2 5 The Manual provides the
grounds for challenges for cause:
Among the grounds for challenges for cause against members of
special and general courts-martial and, unless otherwise indicated
by the context, the military judge are the following:
(1) That the challenged military judge or member is not eligible
to serve as a military judge or member, respectively, on courtsmartial.
(2) That he is not a member or military judge of the court.
(3) That he is the accuser as to any offense charged ....
(4) That he will be a witness for the prosecution ....
(5) That he was the investigating officer as to any offense
charged...
(6) That he has acted as counsel for the prosecution or the accused as to any offense charged.
(7) That upon a rehearing or a new or other trial of the case he
was a member of the court which first heard the case.
(8) That he is an enlisted member of the same unit as the
accused...
19. United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.A. 74, 77, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951).
20. Id.
21. See M.C.M., para. 62g, for limitations on inquiry into eligibility of the military
judge, and see para. 62h for the procedure for inquiry.
22. See M.C.M., para. 62h (3), for the procedure used in special courts-martial without a
military judge.
23. Thus a challenge to the "array" is not allowed. But see infra text accompanying footnote 124.
24. U.C.MJ., art. 41(a), 10 U.S.C. § 841 (1976).
25. U.C.MJ., art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1976).
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(9) That he has forwarded the charges in the case with his personal recommendation concerning trial by court-martial.
(10) That he has formed or expressed a positive and definite opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused as to any offense
charged, except that this shall not necessarily apply to a military
judge who has formed or expressed such an opinion solely in his
role as 'military judge sitting alone in a previous trial of the same or
a closely related case.
(11) That he has acted in the same case as the convening authority or as the legal officer or staff judge advocate to the convening
authority.
(12) That he will act in the same case as the reviewing authority
• . . or as the legal officer or staff judge advocate to the reviewing
authority ...
(13) Any other facts indicating that he should not sit as a member
or military judge in the interest of having the trial and subsequent
proceedings free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and
impartiality ...
26
The Manual and the courts do not always treat all these grounds
for challenges for cause the same. When it is shown that a member
(or the military judge) is subject to challenge under the first eight
listed grounds, "and the fact is not disputed, the military judge or
member will be excused forthwith. '27 It is therefore not necessary for
the accused to challenge such a member and the judge may sua sponte
excuse the member. 28 The failure to excuse such a member may result in disapproval on jurisdictional grounds 29 and though such result
is possible in the case of any of the above listed challenges when good
cause is shown,30 courts have retained the posture that there is a difference between the kinds of challenges."1
In military courts, as in the Federal courts,3 2 wide discretion is
vested in the judge (or court if there is no judge) in passing on challenges. The Manual states that "[t]he military judge. . . should be
26. M.C.M., para. 621 Grounds for challenge under para. 62f(6) and (7) are readily
discernible and will not be discussed further. Grounds for challenge under para. 62f(l 1) and
(12) are treated simultaneously.
27. M.C.M., para. 62c, but see para. 62h (4) for actions to be taken if the court is reduced
below a quorum. The Code establishes the quorum for the general court-martial at five
members, and special courts-martial at three members. U.C.MJ., art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816
(1976).
28. United States v. Seabrooks, 48 C.M.R. 471, 472-73 (N.C.M.R. 1974).
29. M.C.M., para. 62h (2).

30.
31.
Baker,
32.

See id.
United States v. Tagert, 11 M.J. 677 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981). But cf. United States v.
2 M.J. 773 (A.C.M.R. 1976) (suggesting that such distinctions are no longer valid).
See 50 CJ.S. JURiEs 278(c) (1955) and federal cases cited therein.
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liberal in passing on challenges, but need not sustain a challenge
upon the mere assertion of the challenger. The burden of maintaining a challenge rests on the challenging party.""3 His decision will
only be reversed where an abuse of discretion and prejudice is
shown.3 4 The continued presence of a member subject to a challenge
under the first eight grounds will normally satisfy the requirement
for a showing of prejudice, but a challenge may be waived.3 5
A.

Challengesfor Zneligibility

The members of a court-martial must be eligible to serve in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the Manual. Typically,
ineligible members will not be appointed to serve, but counsel may
need to ascertain service or local regulations" affecting eligibility.
While any service member on active duty is eligible for service as a
juror,3 7' providing his rank is not lower than that of the accused,"8
individual services may provide that personnel in specific duty assignments are not eligible to serve. Counsel should seek to identify
the existence of such regulations in the event a member is assigned
whose qualifications to serve are questionable. There may be, for
example, service or local regulations prohibiting medical officers or
legally qualified officers from serving as members of a court-martial.
33. M.C.M., para. 62h (2).
34. United States v. Stennis, 12 M.J. 813, 816 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Autrey, 12 M.J. 547, 551 (A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Harris, 11 M.J. 589, 591
(A.F.C.M.R. 198 1),pelition granted, 11 M.J. 284 (C.M.A. 1981). When the court finds that a
challenge for cause is improperly denied, reversal follows. Se, e.g., United States v. Karnes,
23 C.M.A. 537, 1 M.J. 92 (1975); United States v. Tucker, 16 C.M.A. 318, 36 C.M.R. 474
(1966); United States v. Barnes, 12 M.J. 956 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982); United States v. Goodman, 3
M.J. 1106 (N.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Hampton, 50 C.M.R. 232 (A.C.M.R. 1975).
Where the accused has pled guilty, reversal pertains only to the sentence. See, e.g., United
States v. Cosgrove, 24 C.M.A. 1, 1 M.J. 199 (1975); United States v. Baker, 2 MJ. 773
(A.C.M.R. 1976); United States v. Bann, 50 C.M.R. 384 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975); United States v.
Toon, 48 C.M.R. 139 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
35. See United States v. Bush, 12 M.J. 647, 648 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981); United States v.
Tagert, 11 M.J. 677, 681 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Bland, 6 M.J. 565, 568
(N.M.C.R. 1978); United States v. Henderson, 11 C.M.A. 556, 29 C.M.R. 372 (1960); United
States v. Dyche, 8 C.M.A. 430, 433, 24 C.M.R. 240, 243 (1957).
36. Such regulations may be promulgated by a Department or subordinate command
and while a regulation conflicting with the Code or Manual must fall, proper regulations
implementing or supplementing the Code or Manual are allowed. Compare United States v.
Bowles, 7 M.J. 591, 592 (N.C.M.R. 1979) (judicial circuit rule required judges to conduct voir
dire) with United States v. Bland, 6 MJ. 565, 567-68 (N.M.C.R. 1978) (under Navy regulation, Medical Service Corps officers exempted from jury duty).
37. U.C.M.J., art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1976); M.C.M., para. 4c.
38. M.C.M., para. 4c.
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These regulations do not disqualify the members from serving under
the provisions of the Code or the Manual39 and a challenge based on
those grounds may properly be denied.40 Likewise, a failure to assert
the proper grounds for the challenge at trial will preclude the raising
of the issue on appeal. The specific service or local regulation is the
appropriate ground for such a challenge. Although problems with
eligibility of court members are not frequently encountered in current practice, counsel must exercise care to ensure that such members
are properly removed or that the issue is properly preserved for appeal. Of course, where the member is only disqualified by virtue of a
service or local regulation the challenge may be waived.
B.

ChallengesAgainst Members Not Properly Appointed

Whether a court member is properly a member of the court may
be determined from examination of the court-martial convening and
appointing orders." As previously indicated, court members must be
appointed individually to service as jurors by the convening authority.42 Failure to have court members properly appointed is most
likely to occur where a number of members are excused and replaced,4 3 and several convening orders are used. The Code and the
Manual provide the correct procedure for the excusal and substitution of members.' A member may be permanently excused from the
court-martial as a result of challenge or other reasons without appointment of a substitute as long as the court is not reduced below a
quorum. The Court of Military Appeals has distinguished between
the permanent removal of a member and his excused absence from
one or more sessions of the trial.4 5 The excused absence of a member
is not equivalent to his removal from the court and "affirmative action" need not be taken to reappoint such a member.4 6 The Manual
provides the steps to be taken if a member is absent from or newly
39. See United States v. Worrell, 3 MJ. 817, 820 nn. 2-4 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977).
40. 6 MJ. 565.
41. M.C.M., para. 366; see also id. app. 4.
42. United States v. Harnish, 12 C.M.A. 443, 31 C.M.R. 29 (1961).
43. M.C.M., para. 37c, authorizes such changes to be made orally. The Naval services
have experienced some problems with oral modifications; see suipra note 41; United States v.
Coleman, 19 C.M.A. 524, 42 C.M.R. 126 (1970).
44. U.C.M.J., art. 29, 10 U.S.C. § 829 (1976); M.C.M., para. 37. But see United States v.
Bracero-Velez, 49 C.M.R. 22 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974) (defense waived objection to the addition of
members even though the court had not been reduced below a quorum).
45. United States v. Herrington, 8 M.J. 194 (C.M.A. 1980).
46. See id. at 195.
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detailed to some portion of the trial. 47
Dealing with the procedures and forms used in the appointment
process is routine for the military defense counsel. Civilian counsel
should rely on his expertise and familiarity in ensuring that the members are all properly appointed.4 8
C

The Member as Accuser

A member is also disqualified from participation in a court-martial if he is the accuser of the charged offenses. The Code defines the
accuser as one who "signs and swears to charges," one who "directs
that charges nominally be signed and sworn to by another," or one
who has an interest "other than an official interest in the prosecution
of the accused."'4 9 Typically, the accuser will be the commander exercising immediate jurisdiction under article 15 of the Code, 50 that is,
the first commander in the accused's chain of command empowered
to impose non-judicial punishment. However, any person subject to
the Code5 may prefer charges,52 even if he himself has been charged,
is under arrest, or in confinement.53 The accuser must sign and
swear to the charges under oath before a commissioned officer of the
armed forces authorized to administer oaths. The trial counsel will
normally disclose any instance of an accuser being detailed to the
court after informing the court of the general nature of the charge.-4
This situation is not one counsel should reasonably expect to
encounter.5 5
The Member Who Acts as a Prosecution Witness

D.

A member may not be a witness for the prosecution. The Manual
provides that the term "witness" includes not only someone who testifies personally in court, but anyone whose declaration is received as
47. M.C.M., para. 41e-f.
48. It is recommended that in all but the most unusual situations the detailed military
defense counsel remain on the case. His status as an officer and his understanding of military
procedure will make him a great asset.

49. U.C.MJ., art. 1(9), 10 U.S.C. § 801 (1976).
50.

10 U.S.C. § 815 (1976); see M.C.M., para. 29b.

51. U.C.MJ., art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1976).
52. U.C.M.J., art. 30, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1976); M.C.M., para. 29b.
53. M.C.M., para. 29b.
54. For a guide to court-martial procedure, see M.C.M., app. 8.
55. Such an occurrence is readily identified by comparing the charge sheet (ee M.C.M.,
app. 5) with the convening order(s), and alert defense counsel may be able to arrange the
member/accuser's excusal prior to trial.
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evidence for any purpose, "including written affidavit or otherwise." 5 6 The character of a member's testimony will be the determinative factor labeling him a witness for the prosecution, but the
Manual provides that in case of doubt he will be excused.57
No reported case deals with this issue of considering the member
as a witness for the prosecution when he was formally called to testify, challenged, and retained as a member. Those few reported cases
on the subject deal with the situation in which a member has given
unsolicited information in open court or the questioning of a witness
has been alleged to demonstrate partisan behavior on the part of the
member. The Court of Military Appeals has seldom dealt with instances involving testimony of a member on behalf of the government. In fact, only one reported case deals with the problem. In
United States v. Henderson," a court member-who was also a medical
doctor-identified for the record the medical term for the place
where a bullet struck a victim.5 9 The court determined the member's
60
statement to be an "innocuous in-court aid to the participants,"
since the point of entry was not contested, no objection was made by
the defense, and no prejudice was asserted. The court was unwilling
to find that the member's conduct amounted to testimony.
The problem of a court member who, by his questioning of witnesses, displays a partisan attitude has largely been obviated by Rule
614 of the Military Rules of Evidence.'
The Rule requires that
questions by members first be reduced to writing and submitted to
the judge for a ruling as to their propriety before the attorney can ask
them of the witness. The Rule also provides that counsel may object
to the questions at the time of their submission or at the first available opportunity when the members are not present.
The analysis of the Military Rules contained in the Manual points
out in reference to Rule 614, that "[a]lthough the Rule states that its
intent is to ensure that the questions will 'be in a form acceptable to
56. M.C.M., para. 63. The Manual cites as an example the situation in which a member
has authenticated an official record introduced in evidence by the prosecution-such as the
authentication by a member as unit personnel officer of the morning status report showing
the accused's unauthorized absence. The introduction of such evidence makes the member a
witness even if he does not testify in person.
57. See id.

58. 11 C.M.A. 556, 29 C.M.R. 372 (1960).
59. Id. at 574, 29 C.M.R. at 385.
60. Id.
61. M.C.M., Oh. XXVII, MIL. R. EvID. 614.

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 2:3$61

the military judge,' it is not the intent of the Committee to grant
carte blanche to the military judge in this matter. '62 In attempting
to determine the point at which allowed questions become grounds
for challenge, it may be useful to compare two pre-Rule cases dealing
with questions by members of the court.
In United States v. Worrell,6 3 an Air Force Court of Military Review ruled that questions asked of the accused by a member did not
make the member a witness. In Worrell, the member's questions revealed a correct understanding by the member of Air Force policy on
personality disorders. The court ruled that the information he gave
struck at the core of the accused's defense of lack of mental responsibility. The court held that the question asked "did not amount to
evidence which struck at that core." 4 The member's questions of the
accused revealed information about the amount of duty Air Force
doctors were required to perform, in response to the accused's assertion in sworn testimony that he pulled an inordinate amount of such
duty. While the court found this information extraneous and irrelevant, it ultimately found the evidence non-prejudicial because the
member never explicitly sought to refute or challenge the accused's
assertions, and because the trial counsel never capitalized on the information in his arguments. The most crucial factor in the outcome,
however, was that the defense counsel never sought to challenge the
member or ask for a mistrial, in or out of the presence of the members, as the court noted he could have done. The testimony by a
member at trial is not a jurisdictional defect and can be waived.65
The court ruled that the defense counsel's failure to act, in view of
the combination of circumstances, added up to "more than mere silent acquiescence in the presence of a court member who, by questioning witnesses during trial, allegedly became a witness for the
prosecution." 6 6 The court saw no possibility of harm to the accused
nor standing to complain on appeal.
In United States v. reys,67 an Army Board of Review found that a
member became a witness for the prosecution when he provided
technical information relating to the operation of certain weapons.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

M.C.M., app. 18.
3 M.J. 817 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977).
Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
Supra note 63 at 822.
Id.
37 C.M.R. 626 (A.B.R. 1967).
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The member, though not sworn, informed the court that he was familiar with the particular type of weapon involved in the case, and at
the law officer's request, refuted the appellant's contention that it
was impossible to determine how many bullets were in the clip of the
weapon. At the conclusion of the court-martial the trial counsel capitalized on the revelations by the court member in his closing argument. In reversing the conviction, the court found that the defense
counsel did not affirmatively waive his objection to the testimony by
the witness and speculated that he remained silent to prevent prejudicing the remaining members against his client.
The lesson of the cases seems to be that in the event a member
provides information for the court, whether in the form of questions
or otherwise, the best tactic for both the defense and prosecution is to
attempt to challenge the member in an out-of-court hearing. The
statements must be sufficiently prejudicial, and if a challenge is denied counsel may request that the judge instruct the other members
on the role the information may play in their deliberations.
E.

The Member as Investigating Oftcer

The charges in a court-martial are processed through several
levels before actually reaching the trial. An investigation, informal
or otherwise, may possibly be conducted during several of these steps.
An individual who conducts such an investigation is subject to challenge for cause. The Manual applies the term "investigating officer"
to a person who, under the provisions of article 32 of the Code,' has
investigated "the offense or a closely related offense alleged to have
been committed by the accused." 69 All charges preferred to trial by
general court-martial must be investigated in accordance with article
32 of the Code7 ° and paragraph 34 of the Manual. A final report of
investigation is completed, with the investigating officer's signature
and his recommendations concerning the disposition of the charges.
The charges may be ultimately disposed of by trial at any level, or by
no trial at all. A copy of the report of investigation 7 1 will normally
be provided to defense counsel with the charge sheet.
The Manual further provides that "[t]he term also includes any
other person who . . . has conducted a personal investigation of a
68. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1976).
69. M.C.M., para. 64.
70. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1976).
71. See M.C.M., app. 7.
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general matter involving the particular offense." 72 Thus a member
who, in his duties as security or duty officer, is called to perform an
informal investigation of the offense(s) may be disqualified from sitting as a member.7 3 On the other hand, a member who as Post
Provost Marshall (roughly equivalent to a chief of police) received
and forwarded the report of a victim's death and subsequently received and forwarded information that the accused was suspected of
murder was not disqualified as an "investigating officer."' 74 In United
States v. Burkhalter,75 the Court of Military Appeals held that the denial of a challenge against a member who, as information officer, had
received information about the offense for ultimate public distribution constituted reversible error.
If a standard is to be derived from the cases, it appears that the
member must have affirmatively investigated the charges at the
scene of the incident, interviewed witnesses, or collated information
about the incident for submission as some form of report. Mere contact with information about the charges in the normal course of a
member's duties will not be sufficient to label him an investigating
officer. As with some of the other grounds for challenge, the fact that
a member acted as an investigating officer can be affirmatively
waived and once the fact is made known to counsel a failure to challenge may be interpreted as waiver.7 6
F

The EnlistedMember Assigned to the Acczed's Unit

An enlisted member may be challenged for cause if he is a member of the accused's unit. A unit within the terms of the Manual is the
smallest organization for which a separate daily strength report7 7 is
prepared. 78 The Code provides that in no case may a unit be larger
than a "company, squadron, ship's crew, or body corresponding to
79
one of them."
In one recently reported Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military
72. M.C.M., para. 64.
73. United States v. Bound, I C.M.A. 224, 2 C.M.R. 130 (1952).
74. United States v. Edwards, 4 C.M.A. 299, 15 C.M.R. 299 (1954).
75. 17 C.M.A. 266, 38 C.M.R. 64 (1967).
76. United States v. Dyche, 8 C.M.A. 430, 24 C.M.R. 240 (1957).
77. This report, although varying in form from service to service, is merely a report of the
status of personnel assigned to the unit. It will normally include an explanation of the difference between unit assigned strength and the number of persons reporting for duty.
78. M.C.M., para. 4b.

79. U.C.MJ., art. 25(b)(2), 10 U.S.c. § 825 (1976).
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Review case, the court ruled that a challenge on such grounds could
be and had been waived:
Only if there is no effective waiver of such a disqualification, as
when it appears for the first time after the trial is finished, is it
considered jurisdictional in that it has deprived the accused of a
trial before a properly constituted court. If such a disqualification
arises during the trial, after findings and before sentence, and is not
waived, it merely deprives the court-martial of jurisdiction to continue with the trial until the court is properly re-constituted. In
other words, it is not the type of jurisdictional defect that is incurable by waiver...
"In this case, there was clearly an intelligent and conscious
waiver by both parties of the disqualification of the two enlisted
members assigned to the [accused's unit]. The Government cannot
complain as the convening authority appointed them with full
knowledge of the circumstances. That they were assigned to the
same [unit] as the accused is fully disclosed by the very order that
appointed them to the court, a matter that could not have escaped
the attention
s ° of the accused who saw fit to forego objection or
challenge."
[W]e believe appellant's "conscious waiver lifted the cloak of
ineligibility" from [the member]. "When qualified counsel take a
calculated risk, they cannot be relieved of the consequences merely
because the right may be fundamental." Most important, however,
"while we do not recommend to military judges that they accept
waivers of substantial rights which are granted by the Code, we do
not propose to support a rule which would permit defending counsel to induce error and then seek to take advantage of it on
appeal. 8 1
As the court explained, the fact that the member and accused are
of the same unit will be readily apparent from the convening order,
and diligence on the part of counsel in scrutinizing the orders should
preclude the occurrence of the problem. A member who is formerly
of the same unit as the accused may be subject to challenge under
paragraph 62f(13) of the Manual if the former relationship gives rise
to such a challenge.
80. United States v. Scott, 25 C.M.R. 636, 640-41 (A.B.R. 1957), quoted in United States
v. Tagert, 11 M.J. 677, 681 (N.C.M.R. 1981).
81. United States v. Beer, 6 C.M.A. 180, 184-85, 19 C.M.R. 306, 310-11 (1955), quoted in
Tagert, 11 M.J. at 682.
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The Member Who Has Made PersonalRecommendations Concerning
the Charges

Each commander in the accused's chain of command, as well as
the article 32 or other investigating officer will normally make recommendations for the disposition of the charges against the accused.
The Manual provides that such members may be challenged for
cause. This challenge has not been interpreted narrowly and in
United States v. Strawbridge an Army Board of Review held that a
member was disqualified since he had forwarded the charges in a
closely related case dealing with a co-accused. Likewise, an officer
who forwarded charges while temporarily acting as the commander
in the commander's absence would also be disqualified.
H

Positive and Definite Opinion as to Guilt

A challenge for cause will properly lie against any member who
expresses a "positive and definite opinion" concerning the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Not surprisingly, there are few cases dealing with the expression of definite opinions. Such an opinion may
also take the form of a refusal to abide by the rule that the accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In UnitedStates v. Sutton,3 the Court of Military Appeals reversed the
conviction where the law officer precluded the defense counsel's inquiry into a member's acceptance of the rule. The risk as the court
found it is that a member may "fail to accord the proper scope to the
presumption of innocence and may be imbued with the concept that
the accused must be blameworthy, else he would not stand arraigned
at the bar of justice."84
The greatest danger is not that a member with definite opinions
as to the guilt of the accused will be allowed to remain on the panel,
but rather that in disclosing his opinion and any basis for it, he will
thereby prejudice the remaining members. As the initial stages of voir
dire are conducted before the entire panel, counsel must be careful to
ensure that the member, in disclosing his opinion, does not reveal
information which would prejudice the other members. In United
States v. Richard,8 5 the Court of Military Appeals set aside the convic82. 21 C.M.R. 482 (A.B.R. 1956).
83. 15 C.M.A. 531, 36 C.M.R. 29 (1965).

84. Id. at 536, 36 C.M.R. at 34.
85.

7 C.M.A. 46, 21 C.M.R. 172 (1956).
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tion where a member revealed in open court that he had been a
member of a court-martial that had tried the accused for a related
offense, that he had been approached by the Criminal Investigation
Division regarding another related offense, that he had been consulted by a psychiatrist who had interviewed the accused, and that
he was aware of a polygraph examination of the accused. Whereas
curative instructions might preclude error in some cases, the court
ruled that "every syllable contained the seeds of prejudice" and
"[o]nly a harvest of harm could result," and that it was "impossible
to wipe out the harm already done. 's6 To prevent the possibility of
prejudice, the trial counsel will usually request that disclosures concerning possible grounds for challenge be made in a general form
and not include specific details.8 7 In beginning his voir dire of the
panel, counsel may wish to reiterate the instruction of the Manual:
"In disclosing grounds for challenge, personnel should state only the
ultimate nature of the circumstances which in their opinion makes
them subject to challenge, and not details such as derogatory information regarding the accused."8 8
I

The Member as Convening Authority, Reviewing Authority, orJudge
Advocate

The grounds for challenge contained in paragraphs 62f(11) and
(12) of the Manual serve to prevent the potential for bias when the
same officer who had scrutinized the evidence against the accused
prior to trial, made legal recommendations on that evidence, or reviewed the validity of the findings and sentence also had the responsibility of determining guilt or innocence and sentence. Thus a
member only temporarily acting as the commander may not appoint
himself as a member of a court-martial. 8 9 If the convening or reviewing authority or legal officer were appointed as a member, the resulting error is cured by his removal from the court' or his excusal
86. Id. at 51, 21 C.M.R. at 177. See also United States v. Aaron, 1 M.J. 1052 (N.C.M.R.
1976) (although defense counsel did not move for mistrial, the court reversed because of a
strong risk of prejudice). Cf. United States v. Washington, 8 C.M.A. 588, 25 C.M.R. 92
(1958) (where the court failed to find prejudice in the member's comments).
87. See M.C.M., app. 8b.
88. M.C.M., para. 62b.
89. United States v. Masminster, 7 C.M.R. 593 (A.F.B.R. 1953).
90. See United States v. Baker, 7 C.M.R. 736 (A.F.B.R. 1953); in which the member was
peremptorily challenged.
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before the court is convened. 91
Other Facts Ind'cating Groundsfor Challenge
The Manual provides, in addition to the above-enumerated specific grounds, that certain other facts may indicate that a member
should not sit on a court-martial in order to insure the proceedings
are "free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality. '92 The Manual provides these examples:
That [the member] will be a witness for the defense; that he testified or submitted a written statement in connection with the investigation of the charges, unless at the request of the accused; that he
has officially expressed an opinion as to the mental condition of the
accused; that, when it can be avoided, a member is junior in rank
or grade to the accused; that he has a direct personal interest in the
result of the trial; that he is in any way closely related to the accused; that he participated as a member or as counsel in the trial of
a closely related case; that he is decidedly hostile or friendly to the
accused; that, not having been present as a member when testimony on the merits was heard, or other important proceedings
were held in the case, his sitting as a member will involve an appreciable risk of injury to the substantial rights of an accused,
which
93
risk will not be avoided by a reading of the record.
The many cases dealing with challenges under paragraph 62f(13)
of the Manual indicate with some specificity the facts necessary to
sustain a challenge on the ground that the member's continued presence will cast doubt on the legality, fairness, and impartiality of the
trial. The general test applied to an assertion that the military judge
has improperly denied a challenge for cause against a member is,
however, that enunciated in the landmark case of United States v.
Parker.94 Parker stands for the proposition that the determination of
the validity of a challenge for cause lies within the discretion of the
military judge and his ruling will not be overturned in the absence of
an abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice to the 'accused.
Regarding any member challenged for cause under paragraph
62f(13), the court ruled that "[t]he real test is whether [the member]
is mentally free to render an impartial finding and sentence based on
91. United States v. Ebbing, 50 C.M.R. 425 (N.C.M.R. 1975) (en banc); United States v.
Worline, 50 C.M.R. 47 (N.C.M.R. 1974) (both ruling that although the member succeeded to
the position of convening authority, the accused's election for trial by judge alone cured any
error).
92. M.C.M., para. 62f(13).

93. Id.
94. 6 C.M.A. 274, 19 C.M.R. 400 (1955).
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the law and the evidence." 9
The absence of the requisite mental freedom was termed an "inelastic attitude" by the court in UnitedStates v. Cleweland.1 ' Since that
decision, all the subsequent cases have ultimately ruled on whether
or not a challenged member harbored this inelastic attitude. The
concept of mental inelasticity is not one that is easily applied:
The issue of impartiality is generally ensconced in the term
"elastic attitude", which, both theoretically and figuratively, reflects the desired characteristic of military court members charged
with the awesome power of determining whether the government
has met the necessary burden of proof, and in cases where guilt has
been determined, the sentencing of criminal offenders under the
Code. 97 We recognize that in the voir dire process we are evaluating
and weighing the responses of laymen to oftimes convoluted and
sometimes confusing questions, with the responses thereto subject
to selective interpretation. We do not, without deliberation, substitute ourselves for the trial judge's application of this easy to articulate, but difficult to apply, concept.
The cases reveal a judicial, if not easily ascertainable, distinction
between an inelastic attitude and a mere predisposition. While the
courts state that "a mere predisposition . . .is not, standing alone,
sufficient to disqualify a member,"9 9 and that "a general or abstract
bias. . . is not necessarily disqualifying,"' 0 no clear lines have been
drawn between inelasticity and mere predisposition. In addition,
most members will respond affirmatively when asked if they can set
aside their predispositions in favor of the judge's instructions and the
evidence before them. In one case a member stated that he followed
a personal rule in dealing with AWOL offenses that included always
giving the maximum punishment."'1 An Army Court of Military
Review found that because the member indicated that he would decide the punishment based on "what comes up in court"10 2 his com95. Id. at 284-85, 19 C.M.R. at 410-11.
96. 15 C.M.A. 213, 217, 35 C.M.R. 185, 189 (1965).
97. Citation omitted.
98. United States v. Stennis, 12 M.J. 813, 816 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981).
99. United States v. McGowan, 7 M.J. 205, 206 (C.M.A. 1979). See also United States v.
Tippit, 9 MJ. 106, 107 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Tucker, 16 C.M.A. 318, 36 C.M.R.
474 (1966); United States v. Fort, 16 C.M.A. 86, 36 C.M.R. 242 (1966).
100. United States v. Deain, 5 C.M.A. 44, 49, 17 C.M.R. 44, 49 (1954). See a/so United
States v. Mitchell, 11 M.J. 907, 911 (A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Chaplin, 8 MJ. 621,
624-25 (N.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Cleveland, 15 C.M.A. 213,215,35 C.M.R. 185, 187
(1965).
101. United States v. Sewell, 1 M.J. 630, 634 (A.C.M.R. 1975).
102. Id.
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ments did not reflect an inelastic attitude and the challenge for cause
was properly denied. In some circumstances, though, the courts will
not take the member's assertions at face value. In United States v.
Bann,° 3 although a member with an admitted predisposition against
drug offenders promised to listen carefully to all the evidence and to
refrain from making a decision, the court concluded that "his bias
against drug offenders was profound and intransigent, and that such
state of mind deprived him of the impartial judgment guaranteed to
the accused."'
The trial judge, in ruling on a challenge, must consider a member's potentially disqualifying predispositions and his indications of a
readiness to abide by the judge's instructions. Most situations are not
at the extremes and it is difficult to determine how intransigent a
predisposition must be to become an inelastic attitude. It is not surprising, then, that the appellate courts have adopted the standard
requiring a clear showing of prejudice and an abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial judge before reversing his rulings.
It also follows that jurors may be fairly easily rehabilitated for
continued service on the panel by the judge or trial counsel during
voir dire. The attempted rehabilitation of potentially disqualified
members through questioning and instructions by the trial judge was
specifically condoned by the Court of Military Appeals in United
States v.Tucker' 05 as a means of determining whether a member will
yield to the evidence and the judge's instructions. In Tucker, the defense alleged that questioning during voir dire revealed a member's
inelastic attitude towards punishment. Though holding that the law
officer erred in denying a challenge against the member, the court
commented:
A court member is not presumed to be learned in the law; his answer to a question such as that asked by defense counsel may
merely reflect an assumption that the law demands that some type
of punishment be imposed upon the guilty. With proper instructions, and on further questioning, the court member may disclose
that his view as to punishment is not predetermined and unalterable. Rather, it may appear that the court member is wholly willing to assess an appropriate punishment upon the basis of the
evidence and the law presented in open court. Regrettably, the law
103. 50 C.M.R. 384 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975).
104. Id. at 387.
105. 16 C.M.A. 318, 36 C.M.R. 474 (1966).
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officer did not perceive the appropriateness of further inquiry.1" 6

Rehabilitation of potentially disqualified members need not be
the sole domain of the trial counsel and military judge. Given the
wide discretion vested in the judge, and the consistent holdings of the
appellate courts that the judge's rulings will not be overturned except
for an abuse of discretion, the defense counsel who senses that a challenge will ultimately be denied may wish to consider rehabilitating,
0 7
and simultaneously indoctrinating, the member.1
At this point it would be useful to consider some of the commonly
asserted grounds for.challenge under paragraph 62f(13) of the Manual. While all such challenges are ultimately resolved according to
the standards discussed above, a few have been treated by the appellate courts with enough care to give a better understanding of when
those challenges will properly lie.
1. Predisposition Concerning Sentence-The area which has given
rise to most of the law today concerning challenges involves assertions of an inelastic attitude towards a particular punishment. Of
those, nearly all deal with a predisposition to adjudge a punitive discharge.'I 8 A punitive discharge is regarded as the worst possible
punishment, transcending confinement, reduction in rank, and fines
in its effect and duration. In attempting to ascertain whether a
member has an inelastic predisposition to impose a punitive dis-

charge on conviction, defense counsel will usually ask the member a
106. Id. at 320, 36 C.M.R. at 476.
107. For an excellent discussion of voir dire techniques, including the indoctrination of
members through voir dire, see Holdaway, Voir Dire-A Neglected Tool of Advocaty, 40 MIL. L.
REv. 1 (1968). See also generally, Bennett, PsychologicalMethods ofJuV Selection in the Typical
Criminal Case, SELECTED MATERIALS ON TRIAL PRACTICE (National College for Criminal
Defense, Bates College of Law, University of Houston 1981).
108. The two kinds of punitive discharges are the dishonorable discharge and the badconduct discharge. A complete loss of benefits normally accruing at termination of service, a
federal felony record, and substantial prejudice in the civilian world are all incident to a
punitive discharge. A general court-martial may impose either, while a special court-martial,
if properly convened (a "BCD-special"), may impose a bad conduct discharge. Additionally,
courts-martial are empowered to adjudge forfeitures of pay, fines, confinement, dismissal (for
commissioned officers), and other ancillary punishments. The maximum punishments allowed for each offense are listed'in M.C.M., para. 127c, and a general court-martial is empowered to adjudge any of those punishments, M.C.M., para. 14b. A special court-martial
may impose any punishment except death, dishonorable discharge, confinement for more
than six months, hard labor without confinement for more than three months, forfeiture of
pay exceeding two-thirds pay per month, or forfeiture of pay for more than six months,
M.C.M., para. 15b. Paragraph 15b also sets out the procedural requirements that must be
met in order for a special court-martial to adjudge a bad conduct discharge.
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question substantially as follows: Do you feel that a conviction for
the offense of which the accused is charged (or has been found guilty)
would warrant a punitive discharge, regardless of matters in extenuation or mitigation?"'
In reaching a decision whether a member's responses reveal an
inelastic attitude toward the imposition of a punitive discharge based
solely upon the nature of the offense, the courts today often rely on
the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Cosgrove "0 and United States v. Kames."' In Cosgrove the court ruled that
the following colloquy revealed an inelastic attitude:
Q. [DEFENSE COUNSEL] Do you feel that in any case involving LSD, use, sale or transfer in the military, that a punitive discharge should be awarded?
MEMBER: If the person is found guilty, I think so, yes.

Q. If we present no facts in mitigation of an attempted sale,
would your feeling be that some sort of punitive discharge is
indicated?

MEMBER: If the plea was guilty with no mitigating circumhave to say yes, a punitive discharge
stances, I would.. .I would
2
would be appropriate.'
The questions and responses in Kames are also instructive. In
spite of the trial judge's apparent satisfaction with the member after
he intervened in the voir dire, the court ruled that the responses
"clearly reflected an inelastic attitude.""'
IC [Individual Counsel]: . . .Do you have a preconceived bias in
favor of excluding someone from the service that would be con-

victed of this offense?
MEMBER: Disregarding any extenuation or mitigation?
IC: Right.
MEMBER: If he were convicted of this offense I would be in
favor of excluding him from the Marine Corps.

MJ [Military Judge]:

Now Captain by that do you mean by that

109. Seegeneral/y United States v. Stennis, 12 M.J. 813 (N.C.M.R. 1981); United States v.
Goodman, 3 M.J. 1106 (N.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Sewell, I MJ. 630 (A.C.M.R.
1975); United States v. Bann, 50 C.M.R. 384 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975); United States v. Kelly, 42
C.M.R. 817 (A.C.M.R. 1970); United States v. Fort, 16 C.M.A. 86, 36 C.M.R. 242 (1966);
United States v. Chavis, 32 C.M.R. 645 (A.B.R. 1963); United States v. Lynch, 9 C.M.A. 523,
26 C.M.R. 303 (1958); United States v. Parker, 6 C.M.A. 274, 19 C.M.R. 400 (1955). See infra
text accompanying notes 114-116, but VJ. United States v. Barton, 48 C.M.R. 358 (N.C.M.R.
1973) (for an example of the wrong way to inquire into a sentence predisposition).
110. 24 C.M.A. 4, 1 M.J. 199 (1975).
111. 23 C.M.A. 537, 1 MJ. 92 (1975).
I MJ. at 199-200.
112. 24 C.M.A. at -,
113. 23 C.M.A. at 538, 1 MJ. at 94.
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that this charge is serious enough to warrant a punitive discharge?
[sic]
MEMBER: Yes, sir: I do.
MJ: .Do you mean that regardless of what is introduced in extenuation and mitigation that you will award a punitive discharge?
MEMBER: No, sir: I didn't understand the question to mean
that. I am saying that if there were no extenuating or mitigating
circumstances and he were guilty of specification two, I feel that
this is an offense is [sic]-such that he must be discharged under
other than honorable conditions.
MJ: But there are matters that could be introduced that would
change your mind?
MEMBER: I don't know, with that charge it would be hard for
me to conceive of a mitigating circumstance that would force someone to sell marihuana or any other dangerous drug. I can't conceive in my own mind something that would be mitigating.
MJ: Would you be willing to listen with an open mind to the
matters brought out in extenuation and mitigation?
MEMBER: Yes, sir.
MJ: Would you [be] able to consider these matters in arriving at
your sentence?
MEMBER: Yes, sir.
MJ: Are you saying that it is possible that there is something or
that it is impossible that there is something that would change your
mind?
MEMBER: I am not saying that it is impossible. I just can't imagine what it would be.
MJ: You don't know what the circumstances would be but you
are not excluding the possibility?
114
MEMBER: No, sir; I am not exluding it.
The Court of Military Appeals has not quoted responses by members in any of its reported decisions since Cosgrove and Kanes," 5 perhaps because of a fear that subsequent lower court decisions would
apply a "like Kames or Cosgrove" test to member's responses. With
114. 23 C.M.A. at 537-38, 1 MJ. at 93-94.
115. But see United States v. Tippit, 9 M.J. 106 (C.M.A. 1980) in which the court offered
these comments about the questions propounded by counsel:
ti]t is appropriate to allow considerable leeway to counsel in the voir dire examination of court members as they seek to ascertain whether a challenge for cause should
be asserted. However, latitude for counsel in propounding questions to court members about their reactions to hypothetical situations should not become an invitation
to reversible error. The military judge has a responsibility to assure [sic] that the
court members are open-minded and will render findings and, if necessary, impose a
sentence based on the evidence before them. However, he need not engage in minute dissection of responses by members to artful, sometimes ambiguous, inquiries
from counsel. Unless it is apparent to us from the record of the voir dire that a court
member has a closed mind about the case he is to try, denial by the military judge of
a challenge for cause should not be reversed.
Id. at 107-108.
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only three exceptions,"' courts have not made this application. The
reason lies largely in another Court of Military Appeals decision,
UnitedStates v. McGowan.
There the court distinguished the Karnes
and Cosgrove situation from one where the members merely indicated
a predisposition to adjudge "some punishment""" upon conviction,
again reiterating that the test lies in determining whether the member will yield easily to the evidence presented and the judge's
instructions.
In one case decided by a Navy Court of Military Review," 9 the
court focused primarily on the semantic make-up of the questions
propounded by the defense counsel. The court pointed out that the
questions posed in Cosgrove were couched in terms of the members'
"feelings," what punishment they "should" award, and what sort of
punishment they felt was "indicated." Contrasting these with the
"unambiguous terms" employed in another Navy case, 20 the court
pointed out that inelastic should mean "rigid," "unyielding" or "inflexible," and that some forums (apparently the Court of Military
Appeals in Cosgrove) may have been too quick to find inelasticity.
If the number of cases dealing with the subject is any indication,
the risk that any given member may be predisposed as to a particular
sentence is relatively large. For example, the officer who sits on a
special court-martial empowered to adjudge a bad conduct discharge
or a general court-martial may walk into court believing that a punitive discharge is the desire of the accused's chain of command, given
the level of trial chosen.' 2 ' As someone who has probably had some
form of command experience, he may have made recommendations
or applied disciplinary policies on exactly that basis. Thus, even
where a successful challenge for cause appears unlikely, the indoctrinative effect of proper questioning on sentencing predisposition
116. See United States v. Chaplin, 8 M.J. 621 (N.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Goodman, 3 M.J. 1106 (N.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Sewell, 1 M.J. 630 (A.C.M.R. 1975). In
United States v. Tippit, 9 M.J. 106 (C.M.A. 1980), the court engaged in such a comparison.
Defense alleged that the responses of the members were indistinguishable from those of the
members in Karnes and Cosgrove.

117. 7 MJ. 205 (C.M.A. 1979).
118. Id. at 206.
119. United States v. Chaplin, 8 MJ. 621 (N.C.M.R. 1979).
120. United States v. Goodman, :3MJ. 1106 (N C.M.R. 1977).
121. See generally United States v. Sutton, 15 C.M.A. 531, 36 C.M.R. 29 (1965); United
States v. Carver, 6 C.M.A. 258, 19 C.M.R. 384 (1955); United States v. Deain, 5 C.M.A. 44,
17 C.M.R. 44 (1954) (all dealing with a presumption of guilt associated with the mere presence of the accused at trial).
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may be beneficial to the accused. When the accused presents a great
deal of evidence in extenuation or mitigation, the argument for such
questioning becomes stronger.
2. Command Znftence-Members of the court are frequently challenged as having been subject to improper command influence from
either within or without the court. Where the influence is claimed to
lie within the court, such as where one member is rated by another,
challenges against the allegedly affected members are appropriate.
Where the influence is alleged to be exerted from outside the court,
such as by the convening authority, the civilian defense counsel may
find himself on unfamiliar ground. Neither the Manual nor the Code
contains a provision for a challenge to the array. The appropriate
remedy probably lies in an objection to the method of selection, or as
a motion for appropriate relief,1 22 seeking re-selection of court members. If such influence is not detected until after the trial has commenced, a motion for mistrial would be in order.
The members of a court-martial arrive at a verdict and sentence
by secret ballot,123 so the mere fact that a member prepares evalua-

tions of another member is not grounds for challenge against
either. 12 As the Court of Military Appeals said in the landmark case
of UnitedStates v. Deain,t25 "no reasonable man would believe that the
senior is put in a position to exert undue control over the deliberations of the other. Their association as court members and the submission of a fitness report is not incompatible." 26 In Deain, however,
the court found improper command influence because the reports
were evaluations of the member's performance as a court member.
The Manual specifically prohibits such evaluations:
In the preparation of an effectiveness, fitness or efficiency report
or any other report or document used in whole or in part for the
purpose of determining whether a member of the armed forces is
qualified to be advanced in grade, or in determining the assign122. See generally M.C.M., para. 69; United States v. Young, 49 C.M.R. 133 (A.F.C.M.R.
1974); United States v. Ginn, 44 C.M.R. 484 (A.C.M.R. 1971).
123. U.C.M.J., art. 51(a), 10 U.S.C. § 851 (1976); M.C.M., para. 74d.
124. United States v. Adams, 36 C.M.R. 718 (A.B.R. 1966); United States v. Wade, 35
C.M.R. 685 (A.B.R. 1958). Likewise, the mere fact that one member is another's commander, United States v. Michaud, 48 C.M.R. 379 (N.C.M.R. 1973), or that the member is
on the convening authority's staff and will be evaluated by that officer, United States v.
Ambalada, 1 M.J. 1132 (N.C.M.R. 1977), is not per se disqualifying.
125. 5 C.M.A. 44, 17 C.M.R. 44 (1954).
126. Id. at 52, 17 C.M.R. at 52.
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ment or transfer of a member of the armed forces, or in determining whether a member of the armed forces should be retained on
active duty, no person subject to the code may consider or evaluate
such member as a member of a
the performance
27 of duty of any
court-martial. 1
The Manual cannot, of course, prevent the impressionable junior
member from unconsciously giving undue weight to the comments of
his superior in the deliberation room. The member who evaluates
another member is always a good candidate for the peremptory
challenge.
A common ground for challenges based on command influence is
that the convening authority or other commander has unlawfully attempted to influence the court. Such conduct, unless pursuant to a
course "designed solely for the purpose of instructing members of a
command in the substantive and procedural aspects of courts-martial,"1 2 1 is also prohibited by the Afanual:
Convening authorities and other commanding officers are expressly forbidden to censure, reprimand, or admonish a court or
any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to any
other exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings. No person subject to the code may attempt to coerce or, by
any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or
any other military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the
findings or sentence in any case or the action of any other convening, aproving or reviewing authority with respect to their judicial
acts.
Where the improper exertion of command influence has been asserted, it has usually resulted from some form of an enunciation of
policy. The cases dealing with the subject often are concerned with
the effect that such statements have had on the utterer's ability to
serve impartially as convening and/or reviewing authority. As the
Court of Military Appeals stated the rule, "[i]t is a commander's prerogative to determine. . . policies and to promulgate them as he sees
fit. However, it is clearly not within a commander's prerogative to
inject his policies into judicial proceedings." 130 Even when the court
finds that the commander's policy statements do not disqualify him
from reviewing the case, it may find that the court members were
127.
128.
129.
130.

M.C.M., para. 38c.
M.C.M., para. 38b(1).
M.C.M., para. 38a.
United States v. Estrada, 7 C.M.A. 635, 638, 23 C.M.R. 99, 102 (1957).
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improperly influenced. In UnitedStates v. Toon,' 3 ' the commander issued a statement indicating that the only appropriate punishment
for selling drugs was a punitive discharge. The trial court denied
challenges against the members who had read the statement. The
appellate court, however, set aside the sentence even though the
members insisted that they were not influenced and in spite of the
court's ruling that the commander was not disqualified from reviewing the case.
The Court of Military Appeals has condemned as improper remarks by commanders directed specifically at court members, those
referring to the particular facts of a pending court-martial, those criticizing sentences adjudged in previous courts-martial or particular
combinations of punishments, those asking for particular sentences,
those asking for separation or severe sentences for particular offenses,
those that discriminate against the accused because of his military
status, those which attempt to influence the disposition of charges by
subordinate commanders, and those that are capitalized upon by
13 2
trial counsel in an attempt to influence the court.
While the Court of Military Appeals has indicated that the existence or even appearance of command influence creates a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice, 3 3 the presumption is rebutted by a choice
of trial by judge alone.1 4 The accused does not, however, have the
right to voir dire the panel before the court is assembled-that is,
before making the election of trial by members or trial before the
military judge.'3 5
Where the commander's remarks were made a long time before
the court-martial,136 or in the case where the comments are decided
not to have been improper,1 37 the test to be applied will be whether
131. 48 C.M.R. 139 (A.C.M.R. 1973).

132. See United States v. Toon, 48 C.M.R. 139, 144 (A.C.M.R. 1973) (dissent by Judge
Taylor and cases cited therein).
133. United States v. Johnson, 14 C.M.A. 548, 551, 34 C.M.R. 328, 331 (1964).
134. United States v. Chambers, 49 C.M.R. 220, 223 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974); but see United
States v. Greene, 20 C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72 (1970) (demonstrating that an election to be
tried by judge alone does not waive the error for appeal).
135. United States v. Chambers, 49 C.M.R. 220, 222 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974); United States v.
Hill, 45 C.M.R. 904 (N.C.M.R. 1972); United States v. Dupree, 45 C.M.R. 456 (A.F.C.M.R.
1972).
136. See United States v. Wood, 13 C.M.A. 217,32 C.M.R. 217 (1962) (policy letter issued
twenty-two months prior to trial).
137. See United States v. Toon, 48 C.M.R. 139, 141 (A.C.M.R. 1973) (prejudicial effect on
convening authority of prior statement negated by subsequent statement by convening
authority).
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the member will easily yield to the evidence presented and the

judge's instructions.1 38 In those two instances, inquiry must be carefully conducted, if at all, for the appellate court may question de-

fense counsel who "[h]aving raised the most inflammatory matter
during voir dire,.
39
heat."'
3.

immediately complain at the perception of some

The Appearance of Evil-The courts are also sensitive to the

"appearance of evil" in courts-martial. In almost every situation the
"evil" manifests itself as an indirect result of some command influences; usually in the selection process. 140 The courts have understandably been unable to articulate a specific test for the
"appearance of evil." As an Army Court of Military Review1 41 said
in a case in which a member had been working in the trial counsel's
office:
138. See surpra cases cited in notes 99-100.
139. United States v. Chaplin, 8 MJ. 621, 625 (N.C.M.R. 1979).
140. A body of military case law concerning the selection process has developed, primarily
based upon the well-reasoned decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Crawford, 15 C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964) and United States v. Greene,
20 C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72 (1970). Crawfordstands for the proposition that while a selection procedure which arbitrarily excludes certain groups of eligible jurors from service is prohibited, the convening authority may legitimately look first to indicators such as rank, age
and military experience when selecting eligible jurors. Greene reversed the conviction of the
defendant where the convening authority improperly delegated his responsibility to personally select the members of the court. The courts will presume that the convening authority
properly exercised his responsibilities and in one Air Force Court of Military Review case, the
court indicated that a mere showing through a convening order, that the members were of
high rank was insufficient to sustain the allegation that lower ranking service men were improperly excluded. United States v. Townsend, 12 MJ. 861 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981). Counsel
faced with a panel of high ranking members may wish to view all documents relating to the
selection process for that panel in order to ensure that the procedures outlined in the Manual
and Code were properly followed. See United States v. Ryan, 5 MJ. 97 (C.M.A. 1978) (reversing the conviction where the convening authority had allowed administrative personnel
to select specific enlisted members from a larger list he had selected); United States v. Rice, 3
M.J. 1094 (N.C.M.R. 1977) (approving of the practice whereby subordinate commanders
submitted a number of names from which the authority made specific selections). Seegenerall
United States v. Aho, 8 M.J. 236 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Yager, 7 M.J. 171 (C.M.A.
1979); United States v. Delp, 11 M.J. 836 (A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Firmin, 8 M.J.
895 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Stokes, 8 M.J. 694 (A.F.C.M.R. 1979); United States
v. Perl, 2 M.J. 1269 (A.C.M.R. 1976).
It is also well established that the military defendant has no right to trial by peers under
U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. See Ex Par& Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942);
United States v. Kemp, 22 C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 152 (1973). See also United' States v.
Guilford, 8 M.J. 598 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Montgomery, 5 MJ. 832 (A.C.M.R.
1978); United States v. Wolff, 5 MJ. 923 (N.C.M.R. 1978).
141. United States v. Hampton, 50 C.M.R. 232 (A.C.M.R. 1975).

1982]

CHALLENGES A GAINSTJURORS

The "appearance of evil" must be recognized for what it is, an
appearance, a first impression. Full or even rational examination
by the public of facts giving rise to the "appearance" is not the
norm. We find it difficult to believe that either the accused or the
public could be convinced that a justice system that allows a member of the prosecutor's staff to remain on the jury
4 2 is fair. This
Court cannot add its imprimatur to such practice.1
In some instances, though, courts have approved an arguably
"evil" situation. The accused in UnitedStates v. Noyd 4 3 was an officer
whose defense to the charge of disobeying an order to train pilots was
that he was a conscientious objector. He probably perceived some
"evil" when it was revealed that all but one of the court-members
had recently returned from duty in Southeast Asia. An Air Force
Board of Review did not. In affirming the findings and sentence the
court explained that combat service was not per se disqualifying and
that the members expressed a willingness to try the case on the basis
of the evidence and instructions. The court also found that there was
no evidence of an improper selection procedure, and that the sentence adjudged was lenient.' 44 As the court said in closing, "[a]n accused is not entitled to favorable court members[,] . . . any
particular kind of juror 4 5 . . . [or] to jurors who believe him inno-

cent; however, he does have an unqualified right to jurors whose
minds are uncommitted."' 46
In UnitedStates v. Hedges, 47 however, "the appearance of a handpicked court was too strong to be ignored."1 48 Hedges faced a panel
comprised of nine officers, and as appellate counsel depicted civilian
counterparts to their military duties, the panel included "an attorney
general, a sheriff of a county, a chief of police of a city, an investigating agent for the state, and the warden of a penitentiary."' 49 As
Judge Latimer stated in his forceful concurring opinion:
Of course, an accused is not entitled to be tried by individuals who
have tendencies to be lenient but neither should he be judged by
minions of law enforcement agencies. In that connection I might
paraphase an old saying by stating that one military policeman
might not break an accused's back, but five would. And, specifi142. Id. at 233.
143. 39 C.M.R. 937 (A.B.R. 1968).

144. Id. at 943.
145. Citation omitted.

146. United States v. Noyd, 39 C.M.R. 937, 943 (A.B.R. 1968).
147. 11 C.M.A. 642, 29 C.M.R. 458 (1960).
148. Id. at 643, 29 C.M.R. at 459.
149. Hedges, 11 C.M.A. at 645, 29 C.M.R. at 461 (Judge Latimer concurring).
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cally in the case at bar, while any one of the chosen officers might
not discolor the essential fairness of the trial, when five to seven are
coalesced into a panel of nine, the hue turns dark. 50

The relatively tight-knit nature of the military community 5 ' has
also resulted in situations which cast substantial doubt on the fairness
of a trial. In two Army Court of Military Review cases involving
15 2
trial counsel who also sefved as legal advisors for court members,
contrary results were reached apparently on the basis of the mem-

bers' responses to similar questions. In United States v. Baker,'5 3 the
member indicated that his position as legal advisor "might make an
impact '" 54 on him as he considered the relative weights of counsel's
arguments. The court noted that such a personal relationship may
be disqualifying on the basis of implied bias, but mere acquaintance
is not. 5 5 In UnitedStates v. Mitchell, 56 the court cited Baker for the
proposition that "an actual or implied bias must be shown."'' 5 7 The
court found that although the member stated that the trial counsel
had obtained convictions in all eighty courts-martial the member
had convened, the member was not disqualified. The court justified
its holding by stating that the relationship would not affect the member's "presumption of the [accused's] innocence, his ability to abide
by the military judge's instructions, or his determination to base his
'58
decision on the evidence presented."'
Finally, instances of improper conduct by the member may give
rise to challenges. Such conduct typically includes comments or acts
150. Id. at 646, 29 C.M.R. at 462.
151. The situation at a typical medium or large military installation may be illustrative:
The service member probably deals with members of ten or more units other than his own on
a regular basis. He may live in military housing, with neighbors from units other than his
own, and his children may attend schools on the installation for dependents. He may go to a
church on the installation and may regularly visit the officer or NCO club after work. The
installation probably organizes adult and youth organizations to which the member, his wife,
or children may belong. He may also attend local or service schools with members of other
units, and invariably knows members of other units from previous assignments. The pyramid
rank structure in the military necessarily increases these contacts for officers and enlisted men
as they advance in rank.
152. Such a situation may arise where the trial counsel prosecutes a case arising in another
jurisdiction within the same larger command.
153. 2 MJ. 773 (A.C.M.R. 1976).
154. Id. at 775.
155. Id.
156. 11 M.J. 907 (A.C.M.R. 1981).
157. United States v. Baker, 2 M.J. 773, 776 (A.C.M.R. 1976).
158. United States v. Mitchell, I1 MJ. 907, 910 (A.C.M.R. 1981).
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by the members, either in'59 or out' 6° of court, which demonstrate

that the member cannot be impartial. In some cases, such conduct
may be held non-prejudicial as in UnitedStates v. Cooper. 6 1 In Cooper,
the member, in response to a pre-trial questionaire indicated that he
had a strong prejudice against certain troops. 6 2 He was not disqualified from sitting as a member after the seriousness of his duties was
impressed upon him.'6 3
In UnitedStates v.Rosser, 1 4 the court ruled that a motion for mistrial should have been granted because, among other reasons, a
member engaged in a conversation with the accused's commander in
which he learned of the commander's desire to have the accused separated from the service. Additionally, the member later indicated
that he had not worn all of his authorized decorations in order to
avoid being removed from the court. The court ruled that the real
issue at stake was the integrity of the court-martial and found the
trial judge remiss in his duty "to avoid the appearance of evil in his
courtroom

and .
1 65

.

. foster public confidence in court-martial

proceedings."
Although few decisions are based solely on the "appearance of
evil," its presence can be an important factor in the final determination of a challenge for cause. Astute counsel should remain sensitive
to situations which bring into question the legality, fairness, or impartiality of the court or its members.
III.

The Peremptory Challenge

The decision of whether to exercise the sole peremptory challenge
afforded each side in a court-martial'6 must always be made in light
159. See United States v. Lamela, 7 M.j. 277 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Cleveland, 6
MJ. 939 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Little, 44 C.M.R. 833 (A.F.C.M.R. 1971); United
States v. Sears, 6 C.M.A. 661, 20 C.M.R. 377 (1956).
160. See United States v. Witherspoon, 12 MJ. 588 (A.C.M.R. 1981); United States v.
Rogers, 11 C.M.A. 669, 29 C.M.R. 485 (1960).

161. 8 MJ. 538 (N.C.M.R. 1979).
162. Id. at 539.
163. See id.
164. 6 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1979).
165. Id. at 273. See also United States v. Barnes, 12 M.J. 956 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (the court
reversed where four members had sat on a closely related trial earlier in the day, and in spite
of the members' assertions that they were unaffected by their previous knowledge).
166. The courts have found that the granting of more than one peremptory challenge is
error, but in the rare cases where that has happened, the courts have ruled the error nonprejudicial; see United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973); United States v.
Chaplin, 8 Mj. 621 (N.C.M.R. 1979).
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of any previously made challenges for cause. As in other courts, the
exercise of the peremptory challenge may be required to preserve the
issue of a denied challenge for cause, 67 and its competent exercise is
justification for broad voir dire questioning.1 68 Because of some of the
unique features of courts-martial, the peremptory challenge may also
be used to play the court-martial numbers game to obtain a favorably sized jury.
A.

General

The peremptory challenge may be used "before, during or after
challenges for cause, against a member unsuccessfully challenged for
cause, or against a new member if the challenge is not previously
6 9
utilized in the trial. It cannot be used against the military judge."'
The use of the challenge is limited to the time set aside for the making of challenges, and the judge may properly deny a peremptory
challenge that is untimely. In United States v. Noreen ,t70 a judge was
upheld in his decision to refuse defense counsel the opportunity to
exercise a previously unused peremptory challenge, even though on
167. See United States v. Bush, 12 M.J. 647 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Russell,
43 C.M.R. 807 (A.C.M.R. 1971); butcf.United States v. Cooper, 8 M.J. 538 (N.C.M.R. 1979);
United States v. Boyd, 7 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Shaffer, 2 C.M.A. 75, 6
C.M.R. 75 (1952) (where defense argued that denial of a challenge for cause "compelled" the
exercise of the peremptory challenge).
168. Curtailment of the voir dire by the military judge may also prejudice the accused.
The judge should give wide latitude to counsel's examination of members. United States v.
Parker, 6 C.M.A. 274, 19 C.M.R. 400 (1955). The judge may not rule specific questions by
counsel as "asked and answered" as the result of the judge's general inquiry. United States v.
Dixon, 8 M.J. 858 (N.C.M.R. 1980); United States v. Jemmings, 50 C.M.R. 247 (A.C.M.R.
1975), modjted, 1 MJ. 414 (C.M.A. 1976). A policy allowing only the judge to ask questions
in voir dire is improper, United States v. Bowles, 7 M.J. 591 (N.C.M.R. 1979), afd, 8 M.J. 99
(C.M.A. 1979), but a trial judge may require the submission of questions in writing and ask
them himself, United States v. Slubowski, 7 MJ. 461 (C.M.A. 1979). The judge may, of
course, prevent "fishing expeditions," United States v. Barton, 48 C.M.R. 358 (N.C.M.R.
1973); and prevent counsel from trying to obtain a verdict during the Voir dire, United States
v. Freeman, 15 C.M.A. 126, 35 C.M.R. 98 (1964). Counsel may properly inquire as to a
member's propensity to believe certain witnesses, United States v. Pollack, 9 M.J. 577
(A.F.C.M.R. 1980); United States v. Tomchek, 4 M.J. 66 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v.
Huntsman, 22 C.M.A. 100, 46 C.M.R. 100 (1973); a member's racial or ethnic prejudices,
United States v. Witherspoon, 12 MJ. 588 (A.C.M.R. 1981); his amenability to the reasonable doubt rule, United States v. Sutton, 15 C.M.A. 531, 36 C.M.R. 29 (1965); his religious
beliefs, United States v. Walbert, 32 C.M.R. 945 (A.F.B.R. 1963); his attitude toward the
rank of the accused, United States v. Wood, 13 C.M.A. 217, 32 C.M.R. 217 (1962); or
whether he was affected by another member's improper statements, United States v. Batchelor, 7 C.M.A. 354, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956).
169. M.C.M., para. 62e.
170. 48 C.M.R. 228 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
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the second day of trial the judge announced that he would be willing
to grant a previously denied challenge for cause.
The use of the peremptory challenge to remove a member unsuccessfully challenged for cause is a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, a member against whom a challenge for cause is weighed is
probably not a desirable juror, but unless the appellate courts find an
appreciable risk of prejudice to the accused, challenging him peremptorily will usually cure any error caused by his continued presence as a member.'
Only if the appellate courts are satisfied that
the improper denial of a challenge for cause compelled the exercise of
the peremptory challenge will they reverse for prejudicial error.1 7 In
United States v. Russe1 73 the court refused to take issue with a peremptory challenge exercised against a member who has not been challenged for cause:
Our concern is, however, only to insure that the court that tried the
accused was fairly and impartially constituted without regard to
how this composition was achieved. We cannot nor should we inquire as to why the appellant exercised his peremptory challenge.
To hold otherwise would deprive the challenge of its peremptory
character. The only precondition to the preservation of the issue
before us is that the peremptory challenge be utilized and not simply abandoned. 7 4
It is undisputed, however, that a complete failure to exercise the
peremptory challenge waives any error arising from the denial of a
challenge for cause."'
B.

The Peremptoy Challenge and the "Numbers Game"

The court-martial panel need not be composed of any specific
number of members, except in regard to the statutory minimums.176
The Manual provides that except in cases where the death penalty is
made mandatory by law17 ' no person shall be found guilty of an offense (where the accused pleads not guilty) except by a concurrence
171. See United States v. Harris, I1 M.J. 589, 592 (A.F.C.M.R. 198 1),pet. granted, I1 M.J.
284 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Chaplin, 8 M.J. 621, 626 (N.C.M.R. 1979); United States
v. Brakefield, 43 C.M.R. 828, 832 (A.C.M.R. 1971); United States v. Reece, 29 C.M.R. 837,
843 (A.F.B.R. 1960).
172. See supra note 167.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

43 C.M.R. 807 (A.C.M.R. 1971).
Ad.at 810.
Supra note 167.
Supra note 27.
See, e.g., U.C.MJ., art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1976).
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of two-thirds of the members present to vote.'1 Two-thirds concurrence is also necessary to adjudge sentence, except in death penalty
cases, which require concurrence of all members present, or in
sentences of more than ten years confinement, in which three-fourths
concurrence is required.179 The Manual further provides that "[i]f, in
computing the number of votes required, a fraction results, the fraction will be counted as one. . . ."180 Therefore, a "numbers game"
can be played in attempting to obtain a favorably sized jury. Basically the idea is to obtain a jury which gives the best numerical or
percentage opportunity for success. A jury composed of five members would be advantageous to the accused. In that case, the government needs 80% agreement on the verdict and on any sentence, while
the defense need only have 40%, or two members. While the defense
bears a slightly increased percentage requirement (from the theoretical 34%) the government's increase is far greater in absolute terms,
since four of the five members must concur.'" Another advantage to
the defense in playing the numbers game may be that the govern2
ment usually must exercise its challenges first.'1
Playing the numbers game does not take the place of intelligently
exercised peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges should be
based on perceived biases not amounting to grounds for a challenge
for cause. Also, where a peremptory challenge would remove the
high ranking member that counsel fears will "run" the jury room,
but its exercise would put the defense in an inferior numerical posi178.
179.
180.
181.

M.C.M., para. 74d(3). See also U.C.M.J., art. 52(a)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 852 (1976).
M.C.M., para. 766(3). See also U.C.MJ., art. 52(b), 10 U.S.c. § 852 (1956).
M.C.M., paras. 74d(3), 76b (3) (emphasis added).
A simple analysis of the mathematics of the "numbers game" reveals:
3*

No. req. for guilty
Percent req. for guilty
No. req. for not guilty

4*

5*

NUMBERS OF MEMBERS
6
7
8
9
10

11

12

13

2

3

4

4

5

6

6

7

8

8

9

66

75

80

66

71

75

66

70

73

66

69

2

2

2

3

3

3

4

4

4

5

5

Percent req. for not guilty

66

50

40

50

43

38

44

40

36

42

38

Best time to challenge**

D

P

P

D

P

P

D

P

P

D

P

Best ratio**
P
D
D
P
D
D
P
D
D
P
D
* These figures primarily apply to special courts-martial where the quroum is three
members.
** P = prosecution, D = defense.
Adapted from materials provided to author from U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's
School, on file at Review of Liigation office.
182. M.C.M., para. 62a.
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tion, the challenge probably is better exercised. Counsel also must
understand that the accused "is not entitled to any particular
number of court members, provided of course the minimum number
is met."'' In UnitedStales v. Seabrooks,"' the defense was not successful in arguing that the accused was prejudiced by a denial of the
tactical advantage accompanying a favorable numbers situation
when a member was excused over a defense objection. It would follow that it could not be successfully argued that prejudice remains
where defense counsel fails to exercise a peremptory challenge in the
face of a denied challenge for cause solely to preserve a favorable
numbers situation. Generally, the numbers game is best used where
counsel perceives that no other discriminators indicate advantageous
exercise or non-exercise of the peremptory challenge, or that all such
factors are in balance.
III.

Pre-Trial Preparation for Voir Dire

Pre-trial preparation for the voir dire warrants great attention by
counsel. In addition to providing a good basis for the conduct of voir
dire, because the members of a court-martial are known in advance,
such preparation will greatly assist defense counsel and the accused
in making certain choices: whether to go to trial with the judge
alone, or if a panel is preferred, whether to request enlisted members.
The military defense counsel at the installation where the trial is conducted and the panel members themselves are the best sources of information about the members individually and their behavior as a
panel. Information may be sought through records, questionnaires,
and conversations.
A.

Personnel Files and BackgroundInfonnation

Military personnel files may be obtained from the records branch
of the Adjutant General's office or the personnel office at the installation. Such files should be examined as soon as the composition of the
court is known. Included within them is information about family,
personal, and military background, source of commission, civilian
and military schooling, and past and present duty assignments. In
one case decided by an Army Court of Military Review,18 5 the court
183. United States v. Noreen, 48 C.M.R. 228, 235 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
184. 48 C.M.R. 471, 473 (N.C.M.R. 1974).
185. United States v. Perry, 47 C.M.R. 89 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
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considered it "advisable that some form of background information
on persons appointed to courts-martial be made available to counsel
at the trial level." 1 8 6 The court, however, went on to hold that the
accused was not prejudiced by the government's denial of access to
personnel files. The court declined to state whether the background
information should include such files.'8 7 The court noted that such
files are preferred by counsel because they contain desirable information in capsule form, but that alternative methods to obtain the information were available.an If the government refuses all files of a
court member, counsel may seek discovery of the documents or may
request that the information be provided in some alternative form.
Such background information can provide a good starting point
for voir dire questioning. Obviously, an officer who has seen combat
may be an undesirable juror in a case involving dereliction of duty.
Similarly, an officer member whose military records reflect enlisted
service may be more compassionately disposed to mitigating evidence in an enlisted man's trial for absence without leave. Information about the members also can provide a basis for establishing a
rapport with the jury.
B.

Pre-Tial Questionnaires

The use of questionnaires completed by members incident to
their appointment to a court-martial also serves as a means of securing information about the members and a useful tool to prepare for
voir dire. Such a practice would yield the additional benefit of reducing the likelihood of counsel conducting a "fishing expedition" during the voir dire and would thus simultaneously expedite the
challenge process. Surprisingly, the reported cases reveal that to date
186. Id. at 92.
187. See id.

188. See United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev'd on other grounds , 4
MJ. 115 (C.M.A. 1978), affd on further review, 6 M.J. 719 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978), 8 MJ. 190
(C.M.A. 1980); holding that
[u]pon appropriate demand, trial defense counsel should be furnished those personnel records which the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552] requires to be
released to any member of the public. . . .Information that has generally been
held to be releasable under the [act] includes: a) date of birth, b) sex, c) race,
d) marital status, including names, sex, age, number of dependents, e) home of record, at least of the member's original hometown, 0 education and schooling: the
major area of study, school, year of graduation, and degree received, g) present and
past duty assignments, and h) awards and decorations received, and the character of
discharges from military service that may have been received.
2 MJ. at 642.
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such questionnaires have been used only in Navy courts-martial.' 9
One possible explanation for the lack of use of pre-trial questionnaires in the other services is the fear that, questions having been
asked, further exploration by counsel would be met with predisposed
and adamantly consistent responses. Counsel who rely on their subjective interpretation of a member's responses to questions may be
reluctant to derive that interpretation from a sheet of paper, without
the benefit of kinesic, paralinguistic and verbal clues' 90 available
from the spontaneity of in-person questioning.
In light of the absence of any significant litigation concerning
such pre-trial questionnaires, few guidelines are established. The
Court of Military Appeals has affirmed a Navy Court of Military
Review case suggesting that the questionnaires should be appended
to the record as appellate exhibits,19 ' but in another Navy case, a
board held that a failure to append the questionnaires did not automatically make the record non-verbatim. 9 2 Perhaps the best use of
questionnaires lies in obtaining information as a foundation for more
in-depth questioning. The goal should be to obtain information not
already available in the member's personnel file, while taking care
not to jeopardize the spontaneity desired for more crucial questions. 93 . Questions highly individualized for the accused's trial could
be developed but a general type questionnaire would yield the best
results. The use of such questionnaires can never replace thorough
in-court questioning of members; however, given their potential for
assisting in the conduct of voir dire, pre-trial questionnaires should see
more widespread usage. No doctrinal or practical impediments to
their use exist in Army, Air Force, or Coast Guard.
189. See United States v. Cooper, 8 M.J. 538 (N.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Slubowski, 7 M.J. 461 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Lowman, 1 M.J. 1149 (N.C.M.R. 1977).
190. See Suggs & Sales, Using Communicative Cues to EvaluateProspectiveJurors Duringthe Voir
Dire, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 629 (1978); Note, The Use ofSocial Science Techniques in theJury Selection
Process, 2 REv, LITIGATION 2 (1982).

191. See United States v. Slubowski, 5 M.J. 882 n.2 (N.C.M.R. 1978), aj'd, 7 M.J. 461
(C.M.A. 1979) (noting with approval the use of questionnaires).
192. United States v. Barnes, 12 M.J. 614, 615 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981) (questionnaires were
not a material portion of the proceedings).
193. Questions like "What do you feel is the most serious discipline problem facing your
unit today?" or "Which of your duty assignments did you like the most (or least) and why?"
may shed light on predispositions that could potentially be developed into valid challenges
for cause. A question such as "Are you inelastically predisposed to adjudge a bad conduct
1" is an extreme example of the kind of question
discharge for the offense of
that not only bears the risk of confusing the member, but possibly predisposing his response to
any such question.
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Ailitaq Defense Counsel as Sources

Civilian counsel have another great source of information about
court members in the military defense attorneys assigned to the installation where the court-martial is to take place. Because the members are usually selected as a panel that serves for some period of
time, often hearing several courts-martial, and because of the relatively tight-knit nature of the military community on any installation, militaiy defense counsel will possess a .wealth of information
and perceptions about court members.
Military counsel usually can identify the members who will tend
to run the jury room, those who have been successfully challenged for
cause, those who are consistently good sources of clemency recommendations, 194 and those panels that consistently give severe
sentences.
At this point it may be useful to consider some arguably valid
assumptions that can be made about court-martial panels, the validity of which may also be determined from the local military defense
counsel. A newly appointed panel will likely feel somewhat obligated to find defendants brought before them guilty,' 95 but may be
reluctant to give harsh sentences. As experience on the panel increases the member may be less likely to feel the obligation to render
a guilty verdict, but he will have been somewhat desensitized to imposing a severe sentence. As the members become more experienced
they probably will be less susceptible to voir dire conducted primarily
as an indoctrination tool, the members having developed their own
rules and standards based on their experience. For example, the
panel that gave four months confinement to a serviceman convicted
of a twenty day AWOL would not be inclined to give any less for a
twenty-five day AWOL in the absence of some distinguishing matters
in extenuation or mitigation. In cases where the accused is going
before a seasoned panel it is advisable that counsel observe one or
more courts-martial before that panel to gain some insight into its
behavior. Just as importantly, counsel will also be making himself
familiar to the members. 1 9 Defense counsel going before a panel
194. See M.C.M., paras. 48k (1), 77.
195. See supra note 121.
196. It could be argued that the best voir dire can be practiced around the coffee machine
during recesses in other courts-martial or at other neutral locations. While such a practice
could never be officially condoned, there is something to be said for gauging the personality of
a member in a casual setting, as opposed to the formality of the courtroom. The members
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with which they are unfamiliar should consult defense attorneys who
have experience with that panel.
IV.

Conclusion

In seeking to insure that courts-martial provide the accused with
the maximum opportunity to be fairly and impartially tried, the Code
and the Manual provide that the court members may be challenged
for cause as well as peremptorily. While the Code permits only one
peremptory challenge per side, the broad grant of potential grounds
for challenges for cause under paragraph 62f(13) of the Manual allows wide discretion to the military judge. Counsel may do his part
to ensure the jury's fairness and impartiality by thoroughly preparing
for the voir dire and intelligently exercising the accused's right to challenge the members of the court.
Captain Karl R. Rabago
would also have the opportunity to meet defense counsel in a non-adversarial atmosphere.
The military practice of appointing standing court-martial boards is particularily well suited
to the use of such a technique. Of course, counsel should avoid any conduct which may be
challenged on ethical grounds.

